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I.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

NATURE OF THE CASE
Two and a half years after this Court affirmed the dismissal of all claims against

Appellant ENA Services, LLC, a division of Education Networks of America, Inc. ("ENA") and
affirmed the award of its attorneys' fees, ENA is back in the same proceeding to appeal a
subsequent district court finding that the contract under which it operated for five years is void.
Each step of the process by which ENA finds itself in this position can be challenged, but the end
result is that the trial court entered a ruling on the merits against ENA without hearing any
evidence on new claims that had never been asserted against ENA before this Court dismissed it
from this lawsuit. ENA will argue on appeal that this Court's order dismissing ENA should be
enforced with the consequence that the district court's judgment against ENA after remand
should be vacated.
ENA appeals from the proceedings in district court concerning issues separate and unique
from the remaining parties on appeal. Essentially, ENA challenges the procedural propriety of
granting summary judgment against a party who was (i) previously dismissed from the matter,
which dismissal was affirmed on appeal; (ii) was never personally named in the summary
judgment motion as a party against whom relief was sought; (iii) was forced to become a party in
the later proceedings, being served fifteen weeks after the summary judgment motion was filed;
(iv) was not notified that summary judgment against it was being considered; (v) was not
provided with an opportunity to present all of its defenses and evidence in opposition to the
summary judgment motion; (vi) was not notified that its motion to dismiss on jurisdiction would
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converted to a summary judgment motion on the merits and was not allowed to enter further
defenses and evidence in support of the "converted" motion; and (vii) was ultimately stripped of
its rights as its motion to dismiss was not addressed on its merits prior to the district court
granting summary judgment. Procedural issues aside, ENA further asserts that this Court's order
dismissing ENA from this lawsuit should be enforced, and that the enforcement of this ruling
requires the dismissal of any challenge to its contract (as opposed to the so-called "Amendment"
to SBPO 1309) with the State ofldaho, Department of Administration ("DOA" or "State") that it
faithfully performed for five years.
The only claim asserted in the original complaint against ENA was that it had breached a
Teaming Agreement. This Court previously affirmed the dismissal of this only claim against
ENA, finding that the Teaming Agreement was merely an agreement to agree.

Syringa

Networks, LLC v. Idaho Dept. of Administration ("Syringa I"), 155 Idaho 55, 64, 305 P.3d 499,
508 (2013). Further, as a prevailing party, this Court awarded ENA its costs and fees on appeal
against Syringa Networks, LLC ("Syringa"). Id. at 67-68, 305 P .3d at 511-12. For purposes of
this appeal, it bears emphasis that Syringa had never asserted that the award to ENA ("SBPO
1309") was void at the time that ENA was dismissed by this Court.
As to the other defendants, Syringa had asserted five additional claims related to the
Idaho Education Network ("IEN") award to Qwest ("SBPO 1308"), but none of these claims
included ENA as a defendant. (See generally, id.) The dismissal of four of these claims on
summary judgment was also affirmed, but the remaining claim, Count Three "seeking to set
aside the State's contract" with Qwest Communications Company, LLC ("Qwest")

was
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remanded on a limited issue of standing. Id. at 68,305 P.3d at 512. On appeal, it was found that
the district court had erred in "dismissing Syringa's challenge to the amended contract and/or
purchase order(s) issued to Qwest," reasoning that Syringa had standing to challenge the
"amendment" of the Qwest award and that Syringa was not required to exhaust administrative
remedies because there were no remedies to exhaust. Id. at 62, 305 P.3d at 506. Consequently,
the Court concluded: "We remand that claim for further proceedings that are consistent with this
opinion." Id. at 68, 305 P.3d at 512. The fact that ENA is again before the Court is evidence
that the "further proceedings" were not consistent with the Syringa I opinion.
ENA now finds itself a party in a case from which it had already been dismissed, and has
been forced to appeal a ruling that its contract with the State was void even though that claim
was not pled prior to the Syringa I opinion. The dismissal of ENA was appealed and affirmed by
this Court. Furthermore, ENA's procedural challenges to the resurrected litigation have not been
addressed; instead the district court entered summary judgment, granting Syringa a remedy it had
not sought in Syringa I, without ruling on ENA's motion to dismiss or allowing ENA its
opportunity to respond to the summary judgment motion.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
In Syringa I, Syringa appealed the dismissal of its claims that challenged the

"amendment" that allocated work to Qwest (SBPO 1308).

The district court had held that

Syringa had standing to seek declaratory relief against the DOA to declare the award to Qwest
void, but ruled that Syringa had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. See Syringa I, 155
Idaho at 60, 305 P.3d at 504.

On appeal, this Court found that Syringa had standing "to
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challenge the amended contract to Qwest," on the theory that the amended contract

effect had

changed the IEN Request for Proposals ("RFP") after the bids were open. Id. at 61-62, 305 P.3d
at 505-6. Additionally, this Court found that Syringa had no administrative remedies to exhaust
and, therefore, the district court had erred in dismissing Syringa's challenge to "the amended
contract and/or purchase order(s) issued to Qwest." Id. at 62, 305 P.3d at 506. As discussed
above, this Court remanded Count Three for further proceedings consistent with the opinion
"dismissing all counts of the complaint except count three seeking to set aside the State's
contract with Qwest on the ground that it was awarded in violation of the applicable statutes."
155 Idaho at 68, 305 P.3d at 512. Prior to remand, Syringa had never challenged the original
awards and had expressly limited its claims to challenge the "Amendment" that appeared to
delegate work it had hoped to obtain.
To state the obvious, Syringa made a conscious, tactical decision in its Complaint to
preserve the original Awards, but to have only the Qwest "Amendment" declared invalid. Had it
succeeded in this effort, then Syringa would have been positioned to undertake the work that had
been delegated to Qwest. At no time prior to remand had Syringa ever challenged the original
awards or the "Amendment" of the ENA award, SBPO 1309. However, on remand, the district
court allowed Syringa to wholly restructure its case. Suringa's original challenge of the award to
Qwest was expanded to include a new challenge to the award to ENA. Without having heard
any proof, the district court then ruled that the contract for the development of the Idaho
Education Network under which ENA had performed for five years was void, effectively killing
the IEN.
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Syringa was granted leave to amend by the district court after remand on February 25,
2014, and on March 14, 2014, it filed its First Amended Post Appeal Complaint, followed by the
filing of its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on March 20, 2014. (R., p. 1391.) In it, for
the first time, Syringa challenged SBPO 1309, the award to ENA. Importantly, Syringa did not
serve ENA with a copy of its Amended Complaint or its motion for partial summary judgment.
Syringa argued in its motion that summary judgment should be entered against the DOA as a
matter of law because the awards violated procurement law and were hence void. (R., p. 527.)
On April 22, 2014, the DOA filed a motion asking the district court to reconsider its order
granting leave to file the amended complaint.

(R., p. 1391.)

On June 23, 2014, upon

reconsideration, the district court permitted a challenge to both amendments, but denied leave to
amend the complaint to challenge the original Statewide Blanket Purchase Orders ("SBPO")
awarded to ENA ("SBPO 1309") and Qwest ("SBPO 1308") on the basis of judicial estoppel
because Syringa had not previously challenged the original awards and had conceded the SBPOs
to be valid. (R., pp. 1402-4.)
Originally, Count Three sought declaratory relief against the DOA declaring the
"amendment" of the award to Qwest void; it never asserted a claim against ENA or SBPO 1309.
(See R., pp. 1396-7.)

In fact, Syringa had not challenged the DOA award to ENA or the

"amendment" of that award in its original complaint, but instead sought to have ENA's award
upheld so that ENA could direct IEN work to Syringa as contemplated in the teaming agreement.
(R., p. 1401.) Further, as the district court recognized:
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The Comi entered a judgment in favor of ENA on the only claim asserted against
ENA in the original complaint, Count six. This judgment has been affirmed upon
appeal. In the Court's view, ENA is no longer a party because there is no claim
against ENA in the original complaint which has not been fully resolved.
(R., p. 1403.) After accurately finding the claims against ENA had been dismissed and affirmed
on appeal, the court then directed that ENA "must" be made a party to the post-appeal action.
(Id.) In finding that Syringa could challenge the award to ENA, the district court identified a

new claim without considering whether Syringa could start over in its litigation with a new claim
against a previously-dismissed party. At the time that this finding was made, ENA was not a
party and had not been heard on the jurisdictional and procedural, much less substantive, issues
presented by the newly added theory of the Post Appeal Complaint.
Finally, on July 3, 2014, ENA was served with Syringa's Post-Appeal Complaint with its
amended Count Three, which adds references to the award to ENA, but does not state any relief
sought from ENA (R., pp. 1407-28, 2035.) The amended Count Three sought "a declaratory
judgment against the DOA, Division of Purchasing declaring the February 26, 2009 IEN
Amended Purchase Orders to ENA and Qwest were issued in violation of Idaho Code §§ 675718A and 67-5718 are void and permanently enjoining the State from performing thereunder."
(R., p. 1423,

,r

94.) By 2014, ENA and Qwest had spent five years performing under their

contracts without Syringa ever having challenged their awards.
Consistent with the fact that its dismissal from the case had previously been affirmed on
appeal, ENA filed a Motion to Dismiss on July 17, 2014, contending that Syringa was prevented
from asserting new claims against ENA.

(R., pp. 1434-6.)

The DOA filed a Motion for
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Summary Judgment on August 11, 2014, contending Syringa was not entitled to a declaratory
judgment because the amendments had been rescinded, and therefore, no justiciable controversy
existed. (R., pp. 1448-51.) Syringa filed a Notice on August 21, 2014, stating the scope of its
motion for summary judgment was limited to whether the amended SBPOs were void by
operation of LC.§ 67-5725. (See R., p. 2033.) On November 10, 2014, the district court entered
a decision "converting" ENA's motion to dismiss on standing into a motion for summary
judgment on the merits and then held that it need not address the merits of EN A's motion prior to
Syringa's motion for summary judgment. (R., pp. 1644-45.) The district court then granted
Syringa's motion, ruling that SBPO 1308 and SBPO 1309, as amended are void. (R., p. 1651.)
ENA, the DOA, and Qwest each filed a motion for reconsideration and/or clarification,
with ENA contending that entry of judgment against it was inconsistent with the Supreme Court
previously affirming the dismissal of ENA and that the court denied ENA any opportunity to
defend the newly filed claims. (R., pp. 1715-39.) On February 11, 2015, the district court
entered a decision on the merits stating that its previous ruling applied to all work under the
awards and entered judgment consistent with the finding. (R., p. 2035.) The district court also
found that ENA had been given "ample" opportunity to respond to Syringa' s motion, citing only
to the service of the Post Appeal Complaint on ENA. (R., pp. 2034-5.) ENA, Qwest, and the
DOA timely appealed.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

ENA Involvement in the IEN. 1

The issues in this case all relate back to 2008 when ENA won an award to build the IEN. 2
In accordance with the RFP issued by the DOA in December 2008, the State issued Statewide
Blanket Purchase Orders ("SBPO") with identical terms to ENA (SBPO 1309) and Qwest
(SBPO 1308) on January 28, 2009. (See R., p. 2018.) The State awarded the full scope of work
to two contractors, ENA and Qwest. (Id.) It was obvious that the State would not build two
education networks and the winning bidders needed further clarification on their roles in building
the IEN.

On February 26, 2009, the State issued an "amendment"3 to each SBPO (the

1 This case is familiar to the Court; accordingly, the Statement of Facts will focus exclusively on ENA's role in this
litigation.
2 The IEN RFP sought service provider(s) to design and implement the IEN, which would be a network to meet
distance learning needs of public schools and provide services for video teleconferencing, internet services, and
wide area data transport. (R., pp. 95.) The network would also serve state libraries, higher educational institutions,
state agencies, and other governmental entities. (Id.)
3 This Court will note that ENA will place quotes around the word "amendment" throughout this brief because the
legal status of those documents has never been examined by the district court. When the State accepted ENA's
response to the RFP, a written contract was formed just as an identical contract was formed with Qwest. It is a
matter of black letter law that a written contract can only be amended by mutual agreement of the parties; yet, the
State "unilaterally" issued these "Amendments" that neither ENA nor Qwest was asked to sign. As the State had
issued blanket purchase orders, the "amendments" purported to outline the menu of services ENA and Qwest could
provide and that could be purchased from each provider. Accordingly, the "Amendments" as styled by the State
were not contractual amendments in the legal sense as much as they were clarifications of the specific services ENA
and Qwest were both required to have available under the terms of their contracts.
ENA asserts that this was entirely proper inasmuch as the State had contracted to purchase a range of services
from each vendor, obviously was not going to purchase duplicate services, and had the contractual right to pick and
choose which services it purchased from which vendor. Should this case have been tried on the merits, the proof
would show that the State in issuing dual awards to Qwest and ENA preserved its right to purchase services to the
maximum advantage of the State.
Regardless, ENA's options were limited. It had bid for and been awarded a contract with the State. The State
issued directives for the performance of that contract, leaving ENA with the apparent choice of performance or
breach. Syringa has never argued that ENA should have refused to perform the contract, nor did it ever seek to
enjoin the performance of the contract. Notably, it was only AFTER the Supreme Court ruled that Syringa first
asserted that the original awards were invalid. As a consequence, ENA performed its contract and took the lead in
building the IEN for five years before Syringa challenged the original awards.

APPELLANT ENA SERVICES, LLC, A DIVISION OF EDUCATION NETWORKS OF AMERICA, INC.'S
45950-001 / 809923
OPENING BRIEF - 8

"Amendments") "to clarify the roles and responsibilities of the parties to the Agreement." (Id.)
The State segregated the services required to construct the IEN, assigning the connectivity
("backbone") services to Qwest, and listing ENA as the Service Provider on the Federal E-Rate
Form 471, requiring ENA to provide the coordination of the overall delivery of all network
services and support ("E-Rate services"). (See R., pp. 518-9, 552-3.)
In effect, the State's "amendments" ordered from Qwest the development of the
"backbone," the services which Syringa was to provide as a potential subcontractor of ENA's
under the IEN Alliance proposal. See Syringa I, 155 Idaho at 59, 305 P.3d at 503. Syringa then
filed its suit on December 15, 2009, with six counts against the DOA, the DOA's director and
chief technology officer, Qwest, and ENA.

(See R., pp. 51-2.)

Each of the counts were

dismissed by the district court on the Defendants' motions for summary judgment. (R., p. 52.)
As explained above, the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of five of these counts, including
the only count against ENA.
Subsequent to the Supreme Court remanding Count Three, ENA continued to provide ERate services for the IEN. ENA was bound to provide these services by the contract created
when the State, in issuing SBPO 1309, accepted ENA's offer as embodied in its response to the
RFP. No one, including Syringa, has ever asserted that its contract was not valid, nor had
anyone ever attempted to restrain the enforceability of that contract. Nonperformance was never
a consideration, either as a matter of contract law or as a function of ENA's obligation to the
State ofidaho undertaken to build the IEN.
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As ENA had been fully and finally dismissed, it was not a party to the post appeal
litigation until very late in the process. After the appeal, the case was remanded to the district
court on September 8, 2013. (See R., p. 55.) Syringa filed its motion to amend the complaint on
December 2, 2013, which was granted on February 25, 2014. Syrigna filed its motion for partial
summary judgment on March 20, 2014.

ENA was not served with any of these pleadings

because it was not a party to the litigation, until it was served with the amended complaint on
July 3, 2014.
2.

ENA Included in Post Appeal Litigation.

Having been dismissed from the lawsuit, and that dismissal having been affirmed on
appeal, ENA chose to directly challenge the Post Appeal Complaint on procedural grounds and
filed a Motion to Dismiss on July 17, 2014. (R., pp. 1434-6.) ENA argued that post-appeal
claims against it were barred on core claim preclusion principles, mainly res judicata and judicial
estoppel, relying on the law of the case as articulated by this Court in the Syringa I opinion and
the subsequent opinions of the district court. (R., pp. 1437-47.) Accordingly, in its Motion to
Dismiss, ENA grounded its arguments in the specific findings of prior decisions and drew
attention to what Syringa did not do in the suit:
•

In Syringa I, this Court remanded "count three seeking to set aside the State's
contract with Qwest," stating specifically that it was only remanding "that claim."

•

This Court held that the "district court did not err in dismissing the claim against
ENA for breach of contract," that Syringa was not entitled to an award of fees on
appeal because it "failed to prevail on its breach of contract claim against ENA,"
and that ENA was awarded fees and costs as the prevailing party on appeal.
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•

The district court's June 24, 2014 Memorandum Decision and Order found that
Syringa did not raise any challenge to the original SBPOs on appeal and conceded
that the original SBPOs were lawful and precluded Syringa from challenging the
original SBPOs in its post-appeal complaint.

•

The order also stated that it had "entered a judgment in favor of ENA on the only
claim asserted against ENA in the original complaint" and that the Supreme Court
affirmed that judgment on appeal, concluding that "ENA is no longer a party
because there is no claim against ENA in the original complaint which has not
been fully resolved."

•

The fact that Syringa never sought a temporary restraining order barring the
development of the IEN under the original award and it did not seek to amend its
complaint to include additional claims against ENA when confronted with
motions for summary judgment, and never attacked the Amendment to SBPO
1309.

(R., p. 1439.) ENA contended that res judicata precludes Syringa from asserting new claims
against ENA because Syringa had an opportunity and obligation to bring all claims related to the
IEN awards in the original lawsuit. Although charged with this duty, Syringa chose to only
assert that ENA had breached the Teaming Agreement, and final judgment, affirmed on appeal,
had already been reached on that claim. (R., pp. 1443-6.) In addition, ENA contended that
Syringa's amended Count Three could not apply to its SBPO 1309 because judicial estoppel
prevented Syringa from asserting a position inconsistent with its previous positions in this
matter. (R., pp. 1441-3.)
In considering the arguments below, it is important to appreciate that ENA's defenses are
all based on conscious decisions made by Syringa during the course of the litigation, decisions
that have consequences.

Syringa had an obligation to bring all of its theories in a single

complaint, but chose to limit its challenge to the "amendment" awarding work to Qwest.

APPELLANT ENA SERVICES, LLC, A DIVISION OF EDUCATION NETWORKS OF AMERICA, INC.'S
OPENING BRIEF - 11
45950-001 / 809923

Syringa chose not to challenge the original awards. Syringa chose not to attempt to enjoin the
work under the contracts that were formed. Syringa chose not to attempt to amend its pleadings
to overcome the challenges presented by the defendants in their dispositive motions. Syringa's
decisions have consequences, one of which is that it has waited too long to recast its theories.
Having previously taken ENA to this Supreme Court where the dismissal of ENA was affirmed,
Syringa does not get a "do-over."
II.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

1.

Whether the district court had jurisdiction over ENA where the Supreme Court
only remanded Count Three for proceedings consistent with its opinion related to
Syringa's standing to challenge the State's contract with Qwest, and ENA was not
a party to Count Three prior to the appeal.

2.

Whether the district court erred by granting Syringa leave to amend Count Three
of its complaint to include ENA as a party and grant summary judgment against it
where ENA had already been dismissed from the litigation, the judgment had
been affirmed on appeal, and Syringa had not sought any relief against ENA in its
Post Appeal Complaint or its motion for partial summary judgment.

3.

Whether the district court erred by treating ENA's Motion to Dismiss on
jurisdiction like a motion for summary judgment on the merits and failing to
allow ENA an opportunity to address its merits.

4.

Whether the district court erred by ruling that ENA had an actual opportunity to
respond to Syringa's motion for partial summary judgment.

5.

Whether the district court erred by declaring SBPO 1309, as amended, was void
where it was previously held that Syringa had conceded SBPO 1309 was valid,
and the district court ruled that Syringa was judicially estopped from challenging
the original SBPO 1309.

6.

Whether the district court erred by deciding SBPO 1309, as amended, was void
because it was an (otherwise lawful) initial step in a flawed process.
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7.

Whether the district court had jurisdiction over the matter following DOA's
rescission of the "Amendment" to SBPO 1309 because the issue was moot and
not ripe.

8.

Whether the district court erred when it ruled that the Severability Clause in the
State of Idaho Standard Contract Terms and Conditions did not sever the
"Amendment" from SBPO 1309, and that the "Amendment" was not severable
where the "Amendment" was not signed or agreed to by ENA and unilaterally
issued by DO A.

9.

Whether ENA is entitled to attorney's fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code §
12-120(3), Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and
41.

III.
A.

ARGUMENT

STANDARD OF REVIEW
While the standards for review of a motion to dismiss and a motion for summary

judgment must be discussed, it is critical to appreciate that ENA's Motion to Dismiss addressed
the district court's jurisdiction while Syringa's Motion for Summary Judgment requested a final
ruling on the merits of the case. ENA's Motion to Dismiss was based upon an issue of law,
arguing that this court's dismissal of ENA should be enforced. Had it raised an issue of fact as to
the district court's jurisdiction, then it would have been appropriate under the rules to convert
ENA's Motion to Dismiss to a motion for summary judgment. In considering the standards of
review, ENA denies that there is any authority that would support the district's court's ruling that
its Motion to Dismiss on the basis of jurisdiction could be converted into, and subsumed by, a
motion for summary judgment that resulted in a final order on the substantive merits of the case.
Under Rule 12(b), a motion to dismiss will be treated as a motion for summary judgment
if "matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court." I.R.C.P. 12(b);
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v. 1vfcNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 833, 243 P.3d 642, 649 (201

When a court takes notice

of matters outside the pleadings, the court is to inform the parties of the intention to treat the
motion as a motion for summary judgment and "all parties shall be given a reasonable
opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56." D.A.R., Inc. v.
Sheffer, 134 Idaho 141,143,997 P.2d 602, 604 (2000).

Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. I.R.C.P. 56(c); li1archand v.
JEM Sportswear, Inc., 143 Idaho 458, 147 P.3d 90 (2006).

"All disputed facts are to be

construed liberally in favor of the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences that can be
drawn from the record are to be drawn in favor of the non-moving party." Lapham v. Stewart,
137 Idaho 582,585, 51 P.3d 396,399 (2002). If no disputed issues of material fact exist, then a
question of law remains, which is reviewed by the Supreme Court under an exercise of free
review.

Id.

Where parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment, the applicable

standards of review are not changed; the Court is to evaluate each party's motion on its own
merits. Gracie, LLC v. Idaho State Tax Comm 'n, 149 Idaho 570, 572, 23 7 P .3d 1196, 1198
(2010).
Also, a party against whom summary judgment is granted is entitled under I.R.C.P.
11 (a)(2)(B) to point the court's attention to evidence in the record or provide new facts that
would create a genuine issue of fact. Blackmore v. Re/Max Tri-Cities, LLC, 149 Idaho 558, 56364, 237 P.3d 655, 660-61 (2010).

When reviewing such a decision on a motion for
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reconsideration, this Court is to apply the same standard as on the underlying issue for which the
moving party sought reconsideration:
When deciding the motion for reconsideration, the district court must apply the
same standard of review that the court applied when deciding the original order
that is being reconsidered. In other words, if the original order was a matter
within the trial court's discretion, then so is the decision to grant or deny the
motion for reconsideration. If the original order was governed by a different
standard, then that standard applies to the motion for reconsideration. Likewise,
when reviewing a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion for
reconsideration, this Court utilizes the same standard of review used by the lower
court in deciding the motion for reconsideration.

Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266,276,281 P.3d 103, 113 (2012).
B.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SYRINGA LEAVE TO
AMEND ITS COMPLAINT TO INCLUDE ENA IN ITS CLAIM.
1.

On remand, the district court did not have jurisdiction over ENA.

This Supreme Court dismissed ENA. While Section II in its opinion alluded to other
theories that Syringa might have pursued, its order is clear and unequivocal. "We affirm the
judgment dismissing all counts of the complaint except count three .... " Syringa I, 155 Idaho at
68, 305 P.3d at 512.

Having been dismissed, ENA was not subject to the district court's

jurisdiction when Syringa attempted to start over with new theories in this litigation.
The Idaho Constitution vests the Supreme Court with powers superior to other courts in
Idaho. ID CONST. Art. V, § 2. Idaho Code § 1-205 states that the Supreme Court "may reverse,
affirm or modify any order or judgment appealed from, and may direct the proper judgment or
order to be entered, or direct a new trial or further proceedings to be had." Although the latter
statutory provision is only a legislative declaration of the general powers granted to the Supreme
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Court, they are powers that are necessarily inherent in all courts of last resort. These principles
have long been settled in most jurisdictions, so much so that this Court has stated that it would
"seem to be a matter of supererogation to say that the lower court is without authority to modify
the judgment of this court." Mountain Home Lumber Co. v. Swartwout, 33 Idaho 737, 740, 197
P.1027, 1028 (1921). 4 These principles have continually been upheld by this Court, allowing no
jurisdiction beyond the actions directed by the appellate court, see Walters v. Industrial Indem.
Co. of Idaho, 130 Idaho 836, 837-8, 949 P.2d 223, 224-5 (1997) (holding that its requirement

that the trial court "forthwith comply with the directive of the Opinion," did not include
jurisdiction for court to consider request to amend mi remand), and other jurisdictions, see Ayyad
v. Sprint Spectrum, L.P., 148 Cal.Rptr.3d 709, 716 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (stating trial court "is

empowered to act only in accordance with the direction of the reviewing court; action which
does not conform to those directions is void"); Edmison v. Clarke, 61 S.W.3d 302, 310 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2001) ("Any proceedings in the trial court contrary to the mandate are null and void.")
(quotation omitted). Actions beyond the appellate court's directed disposition of a case will only

4

The Swartwout Court further states:
The mandate of the reviewing court is binding upon the lower court, and must be strictly followed.

A trial court has no authority to enter any judgment or order not in conformity with the order of
the appellate court. . . . No modification of the judgment so directed can be made by the trial
court, nor can any provision be ingrafted on or taken from it. ... Public interest requires that
there shall be an end to litigation, and when a given cause has received the consideration of a
reviewing court, has had it merits determined, and has been remanded with specific directions, the
court to which such mandate is directed has no power to do anything but to obey; otherwise
litigation would never be ended, and the reviewing tribunal would be shorn of that authority over
inferior tribunals with which it is invested by fundamental law.
33 Idaho at 740-1, 197 P. at 1028-9. See also Galbreath v. Wallrich, 48 Colo. 127, 130, 109 P. 417,418 (1910)
"(No modification of the judgment so directed by the appellate tribunal can be made by the trial court, nor can any
provision be engrafted upon or taken from it.").
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allowed "if the action concerns a matter that is a subsidiary issue fairly comprised in the
disposition of the case." Walters, 130 Idaho at 838, 949 P.2d at 225.
a.

The Supreme Court's decision did not grant the district court discretion
beyond its mandate.

In Syringa I, ENA was dismissed and the case was remanded "for further proceedings
that are consistent with this opinion." Syringa I, 155 Idaho at 68, 305 P.3d at 512. In addition to
affirming the dismissal of the only count against ENA, this Court affirmed the dismissal of four
additional counts. Id. Regarding Syringa' s remaining count, the express terms of the remand
limited the subsequent proceedings to "count three seeking to set aside the State's contract with
Qwest on the ground that it was awarded in violation of the applicable statutes." Id. 5 As
explained above, this directive did not, because it could not, expand Count Three to include a
challenge to the original awards much less a challenge to the original awards that impacts the
rights of ENA. Further, the Syringa I opinion did not order or even suggest that Syringa be
allowed to amend its complaint to expand its Count Three to reach the award to ENA. However,
the district court's decision to grant Syringa permission to amend its complaint on remand
allowed such a challenge. Having allowed the plaintiff to revise its theories after appeal, the
district court's decision resulted in a procedural mess and ultimately a ruling that is inconsistent
with this Court's order.

5

This case was not remanded for continuation of proceedings against ENA. Regarding ENA, the Syringa I opinion
stated that tbe "district court did not err in dismissing the claim against ENA for breach of contract," and further that
since Syringa "failed to prevail on its breach of contract claim against ENA," it was not entitled to an award of fees
on appeal. 155 Idaho at 64, 67, 305 P.3d at 508, 511. Moreover, fees and costs were awarded to ENA as the
prevailing party. Id. at 67-68, 305 P.3d at 511-12. ENA was fully and finally dismissed from this case.
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Originally on remand, Syringa sought to amend its Count Three to challenge the SBPOs
to both Qwest and ENA, as well as the Amendments to the SBPOs. (R., p. 1397.) Although the
district court specifically found that "Syringa did not challenge any aspect of the original award
to ENA, or the amendment changing EN A's scope of work in the original complaint," the court
declared, "as an exercise of discretion," that it "would be appropriate to permit Syringa a
challenge to the "amendment" which changed ENA's scope of work."

(R., pp. 1398-99.)

However, the district court ruled that Syringa was judicially estopped from challenging either of
the original SBPOs. (R., pp. 1400-1.) Syringa had not challenged those original awards on
appeal and in fact had conceded they were lawful. (See id.) Allowing the interests of ENA to be
included in an Amended Count Three subsequent to the remand was beyond the province of the
district court and violated the Supreme Court's specific directions.
This Court's directive on remand of only "count three seeking to set aside the State's
contract with Qwest" has not been followed, nor its mandate obeyed. The Court's language
should not allow any other construction than that the mandate directed that proceedings were to
be consistent with its opinion dealing solely with the contract with Qwest. Walters, 130 Idaho at
83 7-8, 949 P.2d at 224-5. Beyond that, nothing. As stated by the Florida Supreme Court in a
similar situation:
It is our view that a procedure which allows an appellate court to rule on the
merits of a trial court judgment and then permits the losing party to amend his
initial pleadings to assert matters not previously raised renders a mockery of the
'finality' concept in our system of justice. Clearly, this procedure would
substantially extend litigation, expand its costs, and, if allowed, would emasculate
summary judgment procedure.
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v. Worrell, 401 So.2d 1322, 1324 (Fla. 1981). The district court erred

allowing Syringa

to file the amended complaint.
Obeying the mandate of this Court, and proceeding in conformity with the Syringa I
opinion were not matters of discretion for the district court. The district court was given a
specific right for proceedings consistent with this Court's opinion. Syringa I, 155 Idaho at 68,
305 P.3d at 512. The district court's clear duty below was to determine the validity of the award
to Qwest; the Supreme Court's mandate did not involve an inquiry into the award to ENA. The
district court had no discretionary right to empower Syringa to amend its complaint, and allow
Syringa to expand its litigation on remand to bring ENA back into the case. (See R., 1398-9.)
By allowing Syringa to amend its complaint post appeal to bring ENA back into the
litigation, the district court proceeded as if this Court had never passed upon the judgment that
had been entered dismissing ENA from the case. Consequently, ENA was forced into improper,
extended litigation with extensive additional costs and expenses. Allowing such a result was
beyond the court's jurisdiction, cannot be allowed, and is not consistent with principles of
judicial economy or with the opinion and mandate of this Court.
2.

The doctrine of res judicata precludes Syringa from asserting additional
claims against ENA related to the IEN.

Similarly, and consistent with the jurisdictional concerns stated above, the district court
had no power to consider or determine other matters not included in the specific directive
because all other matters had become res judicata. Syringa had an obligation to bring all claims
arising out of the same transaction in its original lawsuit. Syringa originally asserted a claim of
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breach of contract against

in this action. As to the other defendants, Syringa challenged

only the "amendment" to Qwest. The claim against ENA was dismissed on summary judgment
in 2011 and affirmed on appeal in Syringa I. Syringa's right to maintain an action against ENA
on the IEN was extinguished as a matter of law when the Supreme Court affirmed the final
judgment in favor of ENA. The district court recognized that all claims against ENA had been
fully and finally dismissed in Syringa I (R. Vol. I., p. 1403 ("In the Court's view, EN A is no
longer a party because there is no claim against ENA in the original complaint which has not
been fully resolved.")), yet did not recognize that the decision created the right for ENA to be
free from further litigation related to the IEN (Id. ("ENA must be made a party to this action.")).
While this Court may have concluded in Syringa I that Syringa could have asserted a claim
against ENA in Count Three of its original complaint, the plain fact is that Syringa did not do so.
In allowing Syringa to sue ENA on theories that Syringa had not previously asserted against
ANY defendant, the district court enabled proceedings that were NOT consistent with this
Court's ruling.
The doctrine of res judicata is substantive law; it is not a procedural mechanism that
addresses a defect in the pleadings but rather a principle of substantive law that holds that a
party, absent fraud, is not allowed to take the proverbial "two bites at the apple." See Walters,
130 Idaho at 838, 949 P.2d at 838 (stating claim preclusion bars the attempt to "raise a new legal
theory to seek a remedy for acts arising out of [the same] transaction"). The principle extends
not only to "every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat" a claim, but also to "every
matter which might and should have been" previously litigated. Farmers Nat. Bank v. Shirey,
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126 Idaho 63, 70, 878 P.2d 762, 769 (1994). The res judicata analysis in Idaho case law may
involve both claim preclusion (true res judicata) and issue preclusion (collateral estoppel). See
Tic or Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 123, 157 P .3d 613, 617 (2007). True res judicata, or

claim preclusion, is implicated in this post-appeal action and should operate to bar any claims
asserted by Syringa against ENA.
"Under the principles of claim preclusion, a valid final judgment rendered on the merits
... is an absolute bar to a subsequent action between the same parties upon the same claim."
Hindmarsh v. Mock, 138 Idaho 92, 94, 57 P.3d 803, 805 (2002). Claim preclusion protects

parties from the harassment and expense of defending multiple lawsuits, conserves judicial
resources, and minimizes the possibility of inconsistent decisions. Silver Eagle J'vfining Co. v.
State, 153 Idaho 176, 182, 280 P.3d 679, 685 (2012) (citing Montana v. United States, 440 U.S.

147, 153-54 (1979)). A claim will be precluded if it could have been brought in the previous
action, "where: (1) the original action ended in final judgment on the merits, (2) the present
claim involves the same parties as the original action, and (3) the present claim arises out of the
same transaction or series of transactions as the original action." Berkshire Investments, LLC v.
Taylor, 153 Idaho 73, 81,278 P.3d 943, 951 (2012) (citing Ticor Title, 144 Idaho at 125-27, 157

P .3d at 618-20). The record of this matter firmly establishes the elements ofres judicata barring
any additional action by Syringa against ENA arising out of the IEN.
a.

The original action against ENA ended in a final judgment on the merits.

As stated above, the district court has ruled that the original action against ENA ended in
a final judgment on the merits; "ENA is no longer a party because there is no claim against ENA
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the original complaint which has not been fully resolved." (R., p. 1403.) On appeal, the final
judgment and dismissal of ENA as a party to the action was upheld. Syringa I, 155 Idaho at 64,
305 P.3d at 508. Thus, regarding step one of a claim preclusion analysis, the original action
against ENA ended in a final judgment on the merits. See Berkshire Investments, 153 Idaho at
81,278 P.3d at 951.

i.

The fact that count three was remanded does not negate or
postpone the finality as to ENA and the claims against ENA.

Syringa has argued below that a judgment for a party cannot be final unless final
judgments are reached on all remaining claims and parties in a specific litigation. This position
confuses the finality requirements for appealability with the finality requirements for res
judicata. A final judgment for purposes of appealability was issued in this case on March 7,
2011 as to all defendants. The Syringa I opinion was released in August 2013 "affirm[ing] the
judgment dismissing all counts of the complaint except count three" and remanding only "that
claim" for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. 155 Idaho at 68, 305 P.3d at 512. The
final judgment that allowed an appeal was affirmed by this Court, precluding further claims
against ENA arising out of the same transaction. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments, § 13,
comment b. ("Comparison with finality for purposes of appellate review."); Wright, Miller &
Cooper, 18A Fed. Prac. & Proc.: Jurisdiction§ 4432 Finality-Traditional Requirement.
The Supreme Court specifically affirmed the final judgment as to all counts except count
three. Syringa I, 155 Idaho at 68, 305 P.3d at 512. Accordingly, as to ENA, the final judgment
was affirmed and is no longer subject to further revision; the judgment as to ENA was final for
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res judicata purposes. See _Melton v. Lehmann, 118 Idaho 61, 64, 794 P.2d 650, 653 (1990)
(holding res judicata applies only to final judgments); Restatement of Judgments (Second) §
24(1) ("[A] valid and final judgment rendered in an action extinguishes the plaintiffs claim.").
The general rule is that "a judgment affirmed is final for res judicata purposes as to those parts of
the action no longer subject to litigation." Allerrimack St. Garage, Inc. v. Gen. }lfotors Corp., 667
F. Supp. 41, 44 (D.N.H. 1987); see also Ernest W Hahn, Inc. v. Codding, C-75-2706 RPA, 1981
WL 2191, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 1981) ("Since the judgment on Codding's first claim was
affirmed by the Ninth Circuit, it is final and cannot be relitigated. Codding's argument that the
judgment was not 'final,' thus not entitled to res judicata effect, is without merit. 'A case
remanded for further hearing or over which jurisdiction is retained for some purposes may
nonetheless be final as to other issues determined."' (quoting Bullen v. DeBretteville, 239 F. 2d
824,829 (9th Cir. 1959)); Mazaleski v. Harris, 481 F. Supp. 696,698 (D.D.C. 1979) ("Only that
issue (affirmed on appeal] could remain unaffected by further proceedings in the trial court; thus
only judgment on that issue is entitled to Res judicata effect."). Thus, any right of action against
ENA was effectively extinguished by operation of law once this Court affirmed the final
judgment as to ENA. The finality requirements for preclusion were met.
b.

The post-appeal claim involves the same parties as the original action.

Next, the Post Appeal Complaint involves parties that were parties to the original
Complaint. The amended Count Three clearly involves parties that were all part of the original
action (Syringa, DOA, Qwest, ENA) and satisfies the second prong of the claim preclusion
analysis. See Berkshire Investments, 153 Idaho at 81,278 P.3d at 951.
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c.

The additional claim against ENA challenging SBPO 1309 arises out of
the same series of transactions as the original action.

Finally, the amended claim undeniably arises out of the same series of transactions or
occurrences that were disputed in the original action.

Count Three deals with identical

transactions-the Amendments to the SBPOs. Regarding the only initial claim against ENA
(Count Six), the Teaming Agreement was formed to submit a bid proposal to the IEN RFP for
what became the January 2009 SBPO. Count Three of the Post Appeal Complaint, which now
refers to the "Amendment" to the SBPO to ENA, arises out of the same series of transactions as
the Teaming Agreement which Syringa alleged had been breached by ENA in the original Count
Six. Accordingly, the amended Count Three should not have included the challenge against
ENA's interests, since it entails the same parties and the same transaction that ended in final
judgment on the merits in the original action filed by Syringa. See Berkshire Investments, 153
Idaho at 81,278 P.3d at 951.
3.

The doctrine of judicial estoppel precludes Syringa on remand from
challenging a contract award that it specifically chose not to challenge in its
original suit.

Five years ago when Syringa filed suit, it did not allege any claim challenging the award
to ENA of the original SBPO 1309 or its "unilateral" amendment by the State. (See R., p. 1397.)
Indeed, Syringa very intentionally pled a theory that would have preserved the original awards
and declared only the Qwest "amendment" invalid, essentially alleging that the connectivity
services awarded to Qwest should have been awarded to Syringa under the IEN Alliance
Proposal. (See id.) This was a deliberate and calculated move by Syringa, as Syringa's obvious
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purpose was to leverage its position and preserve the possibility that it could still displace Qwest
as the "backbone" provider under the award. Accordingly, Syringa never moved for a temporary
restraining order to enjoin the development of the IEN pursuant to the original award, nor did it
seek to amend its complaint to include additional claims against ENA when confronted with
motions for summary judgment.

As a consequence, the parties have spent five years fully

engaged in hard fought litigation over the "transaction and occurrence" of the award while
simultaneously performing the IEN contract, wiring the schools, investing in the infrastructure,
and connecting thousands of students together for an improved learning experience. During this
time, Syringa took advantage of the contract to provide services, accepting the benefits of the
contract, 6 all resulting in the anomalous position of the State defending a contract that Syringa,
five years into its performance, now changes course to declare invalid. Having strategically
elected not to challenge the ENA SBPO or its "Amendment" in its original Count Three, Syringa
should be judicially estopped from now adding ENA to the claim.
Judicial estoppel, also known as the doctrine of preclusion of inconsistent positions,
"precludes a party from gaining an advantage by taking one position, and then seeking a second
advantage by taking an incompatible position." Sword v. Sweet, 140 Idaho 242, 252, 92 P.3d
492, 502 (2004) (citing Rissetto v. Plumbers and Steamfitters Local 343, 94 F.2d 597, 600 (9th
Cir. 1996)).

The underlying policies of judicial estoppel "are general considerations of the

orderly administration of justice and regard for the dignity of judicial proceedings." Sword, 140

6

Syringa has provided services under the contract and has been paid over $1.4 million. (See R., pp. 1131, 175.)
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Idaho at 252, 92 P.3d at 502. Its intent is to "protect against a litigant playing fast and loose with
the courts." Id.
The doctrine of judicial estoppel prevents Syringa from asserting the amended Count
Three against ENA, as the claim is inconsistent with Syringa's previous positions taken in this
matter relevant to ENA. Syringa initially sought to preserve the awards, and have declared
invalid only the "amendment" benefitting Qwest.
In the appeal years later, the Supreme Court briefly discussed a theory that Syringa never
pled in assessing whether Syringa had alleged a theory under which it had standing.

The

Supreme Court's comments on a theory that Syringa never pled may highlight defects in
Syringa's original strategy, but they do not resurrect a lawsuit against a party previously
dismissed. Syringa, who already identified its claims for litigation, should not be able to change
those claims five years later to suit its changing strategy as arguments and claims rise and fall.
Syringa's choice of legal theories at the outset of this litigation had substantive consequences.
Sword, 140 Idaho at 252, 92 P.3d at 502. However, the district court failed to recognize the full

extent of those consequences.
Although the district court initially realized on remand that Syringa had not challenged
any aspect of the award to ENA in its original suit 7, it nevertheless allowed Syringa to change
course and pursue a new theory.

Consequently, the district court allowed the Post Appeal

7 See R., p. 1398 ("Syringa did not challenge any aspect of the original award to ENA, or the amendment changing
EN A's scope of work in the original complaint.").
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Complaint to include a challenge against the "Amended Purchase Order" to ENA. (See R., p.
1404.) This decision was inconsistent with its accompanying holding in the same Order.
In its Order reconsidering Syringa's motion to amend, the district court applied the
doctrine of judicial estoppel to bar Syringa's newly articulated theories challenging the original
award. (R., p. 1402.) It noted that Syringa had never challenged the original awards in either the
trial court or the appellate courts. "Syringa did not challenge the award of the original SBPO's
and conceded that the original SBPO's were lawful." (R., p. 1401.) "Now, Syringa seeks to
argue that the original awards were an unlawful pretext to divide the scope of the work between
Qwest and ENA." (R., p. 1402.) The district court has held, "(t)he doctrine of judicial estoppel
precludes Syringa from having it both ways." (Id.) However, when ENA presented the district
court with a similar argument regarding the amended Count Three against ENA, the district court
failed to prevent Syringa from "impos[ing] an unfair detriment" on ENA, which required ENA to
defend against Syringa's additional litigation inconsistent with Syringa's previous suit. See A &
J Const. Co. v. Wood, 141 Idaho 682, 687, 116 P.3d 12, 17 (2005) (citing New Hampshire v.
Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 751 (2001)) (determining whether judicial estoppel be applied may include

considering "whether the party asserting the inconsistent position 'would derive an unfair
advantage or impose an unfair detriment on the opposing party if not estopped"'). ENA relied
on the fact that Syringa was not challenging additional issues surrounding the IEN transaction
when it conducted discovery and motion practice in the original suit.
In addition to considerations of fundamental fairness, there are practical reasons for the
doctrine of judicial estoppel as well as limitations on the Supreme Court's jurisdiction after
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remand. Here, ENA changed position in reliance upon Syringa's failure to enjoin performance
of the awards. ENA's options, as expressed above, were significantly limited; the State thought
it had an enforceable contract; and Syringa never moved to enjoin its enforcement.
performed its contract for five years before Syringa challenged it.

ENA

A principal role of

jurisprudence is to bring certainty to legal relationships. If theoretical language in an appellate
court's decision on standing allows the Syringas of the world to continually recast theories
through multiple appeals, then these goals are defeated.
Thus, consistent with its reasons supporting a finding that Syringa could not challenge the
original SBPOs, the district court should have also found that judicial estoppel bars Syringa's
amended Count Three as it applied to ENA Syringa's election to not sue ENA on the same
theory originally is no less an intentional statement to the court than Syringa's concession that
the original SBPOs were lawful. Syringa had its opportunity to allege that the original award
benefitting ENA was illegal in its original suit, but it intentionally did not do so and ENA was
dismissed on the theories that had been asserted against it by Syringa. Having elected not to sue
ENA in its challenge raised under Count Three, Syringa is judicially estopped from adding ENA
to that claim now.
C.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING ENA'S MOTION TO
DISMISS WITHOUT ADDRESSING ITS MERITS.

Although the ruling in Syringa I presented ENA with substantive rights to be free from
the vexation of further litigation related to the IEN, the district court endorsed ENA as a party to
further proceedings. Armed with this endorsement, Syringa served ENA with its Post Appeal
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Complaint.

moved for dismissal, requesting the court recognize it could not properly be

made a party to the action. (R., pp. 1434-6.) Instead of upholding ENA's rights, the district
court dismissed ENA's motion without addressing its merits, and granted Syringa relief by
summary judgment. (See generally, R., pp. 1638-53.) By failing to address the merits of EN A's
motion, the district court focused on whether the record supported Syringa's motion for partial
summary judgment against all parties prior to exploring whether Syringa could legally and
procedurally maintain a claim against one of those parties-ENA. Although the district court
specifically found that "ENA's arguments correctly state[d] the law," it rejected these arguments
and only addressed Syringa's motion. (R., p. 1647.) To reach this decision, the court stated that
it was treating ENA's motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment and improperly
found that it "need not address the merits of EN A's motion to dismiss prior to Syringa's motion
for summary judgment." (R., p. 1645.) Essentially, the district court recognized that ENA had
procedural and affirmative defenses to Syringa's claims, but decided to ignore the issues and
instead went to the merits of Syringa's motion for partial summary judgment. This was done in
error. Ignoring its affirmative defenses denied ENA due process of law, the ability to conduct
discovery and investigation, and to develop the facts that would support its defenses.
1.

The district court improperly converted ENA's motion to avoid a ruling on
its merits.

While it may have been appropriate under Rule 12(b) for the district court to convert a
motion to dismiss had the motion offered disputed matters of fact, ENA's motion included no
disputed issues of fact. See, e.g., Allen v. Dep 't of Parks & Rec., 136 Idaho 487, 488, 36 P.3d
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1

1276 (2001) (converting motion supported by affidavits). The court acknowledged there

were no factual issues in dispute by stating that ENA's motion to dismiss was based upon legal
doctrines. (R., p. 1644.) Despite the fact that ENA had presented a motion to dismiss free of any
disputed facts, and addressed entirely different issues than the then-pending motions for
summary judgment, the district court improperly combined ENA's challenges in with the parties'
motions and ruled on the merits of the summary judgment motions. By doing so, the district
court was able to completely bypass any issues related to whether ENA was a proper party in the
post-appeal suit.

Thus, the court avoided its duty to address those issues, even while

acknowledging that ENA had correctly stated the law. However, the court's jurisdiction over
ENA cannot be established merely by refusing to address ENA's motion; the validity of ENA's
affirmative defenses must be resolved if the case is to be properly adjudicated on its merits as to
ENA.
a.

The district court cannot ignore the affirmative defenses presented in
ENA 's motion.

As to ENA's interests and motion, the rules and precedent of Idaho courts require that
ENA's motion must be addressed before a ruling can be made on Syringa's summary judgment
motion. This Court has previously ruled that a district court errs by failing to address the
presentation of affirmative defenses before granting summary judgment. In Chandler v. Hayden,
) this Court vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment finding that the district court
erred by enforcing a contract without first considering affirmative defenses related to its
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formation and enforceability. 147 Idaho 765, 771, 215 P.3d 485, 491 (2009). If proven, the
affirmative defenses could have invalidated the agreement in the first place. Id.
Here, the district court erred in a more dramatic way than the district court in Chandler.
The district court ruled that as a matter of law it could deem the award to ENA void without first,
indeed ever, deciding that ENA was properly a party. If ENA's arguments are correct (as the
district court all but seems to have concluded by stating it "correctly state[ d] the law") and the
dismissal of ENA being affirmed on appeal has legal consequences to Syringa' s claims on
remand, then the district court is not authorized to rule as to ENA and its contract award.
Accordingly, this matter must be remanded to address ENA's affirmative defenses to Syringa's
amended claim. See also Idaho Power Co. v. State, By & Through Dep 't of Water Res., 104
Idaho 575, 588, 661 P.2d 741, 754 (1983) (requiring consideration of affirmative defenses
related to issue incorrectly rendered moot by district court's summary judgment ruling).
In addition, a court is prevented from disregarding materials before it on summary
judgment much in the same way it is prevented from seizing upon issues not before it on motion
for summary judgment.

In Sirius LC v. Erickson, Erickson had listed thirteen affirmative

defenses in his answer to a foreclosure action, and moved for summary judgment on one of those
affirmative defenses, lack of consideration. 144 Idaho 38, 40, 156 P.3d 539, 541 (2007). The
court denied Erickson's motion, and further granted summary judgment with respect to his
twelve remaining affirmative defenses because he had failed to submit any evidence to raise any
related issues of material fact. Id. On appeal, Erickson argued that this was in error because
neither party raised these issues at summary judgment; this Court agreed. Id. at 43, 156 P.3d at
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Since neither party had put those defenses at issue, this Court held that he was not required
to come forth with evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact. Id. This Court stated that
a court's authority on summary judgment is "limited to the issues placed before it" by the
motion. Id. Erickson had placed only one issue on summary judgment, and the plaintiff did not
file its own motion, so the Court reasoned that when the district court ruled on the remaining
affirmative defenses, it "improperly 'seized upon' matters not before it pursuant to the movant's
motion." Id. (citing Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527, 531, 887 P.2d 1034,
1038 (1994). The summary judgment was vacated as to the affirmative defenses not at issue in
the summary judgment.
The flipside to this same reasoning has application to this case as well. Just as a district
court is not given the authority to "seize upon" issues not before it on summary judgment, a court
has no authority to disregard matters that are properly before it to rule on another party's motion.
The district court in this case was well aware of the arguments presented in EN A's motion when
it ruled on Syringa's motion. ENA chose to file a motion and place its affirmative defenses at
issue when it was presented with the possibility of defending an action from which it had already
been dismissed. Those affirmative defenses were still at issue when the district court chose to
grant Syringa's motion. Thus, it was improper for the court to disregard them while ruling on
the other issues before the court.
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b.

The district court's dutv to address the validity of a contract does not take
priority over the law of the case or basic iurisdictional principles.

The district court disregarded ENA's arguments because it reasoned that it was required
to first address the issue of whether the "Amendment" to the ENA SBPO 1309 was illegal.
However, the fact that Syringa now alleges that both "amendments," and therefore the award
may be illegal, does not result in ENA losing its right to assert its defenses to Syringa's newly
asserted claims. In particular, ENA is not denied its right to assert its defenses of judicial
estoppel and res judicata.
While, this Court did "remand [count three] for further proceedings that are consistent
with [its] opinion," it did not, and could not waive any of ENA's defenses, substantive or
procedural. In point of fact, this Court ruled simply that Syringa had "standing to challenge the
amended contract to Qwest." Syringa I at 62, 305 P.3d at 506. The Supreme Court's finding did
not infer there were no other grounds upon which Syringa' s claim could be dismissed.
Furthermore, the doctrine of the law of the case directs that:
[T]he rule of law necessary to the Court's decision on appeal must be adhered to
throughout the case's subsequent progress, both in the trial court and upon
subsequent appeal. Where the case is remanded to the trial court, the case "must
be tried in light of and in consonance with the rules of law as announced by the
appellate court in that particular case."
Robideaux v. Idaho Dep 't of Lands, CV 2005 8728, 2006 WL 3304476 (Idaho Dist. Oct. 10,

2006) (citations omitted). The law of this case is that Syringa's case against ENA on the IEN
was dismissed in the lower court, and the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal. No further
claims, which should have been brought in the original action, can be brought against ENA by
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Syringa. Berkshire Investments, LLC v. Taylor, 153 Idaho 73, 81, n.7, 278 P.3d 943, 951, n.7
(2012) (citing Swanson v. Swanson, 134 Idaho 512, 515, 5 P.3d 973, 976 (2000)) ("[T]he law of
the case doctrine . . . applies to bar re-litigation . . . in a single case and its subsequent
progress.")). Thus, the application of the law of the case extinguishes Syringa's right of action
against ENA by operation oflaw, and the determination as to illegality must not override ENA's
right to present defenses consistent with the law of the case.
To dismiss ENA's motion and ignore the applicability of the arguments presented
therein, the district court instead focused on its perceived duty to raise the issue of illegality. (R.,
pp. 1648-51.) Citing Quiringv. Quiring, 130 Idaho 560, 566-7, 944 P.2d695, 701-2 (1997), the
court concluded, as it thought it was required to do by this Court's ruling, that the award of
SBPO 1309 to ENA, "when amended to divide the scope of work, violated state procurement
law, and is void." (R., p. 1649.) As the district court apparently concluded that this Court's
opinion required this ruling, the district court never considered the possibility that the facts might
support the conclusion that, while the "amendments" were void as a result of actions taken after
the awards issued, the original awards remain valid. In addition, if the district court truly had the
obligation and was "not free to ignore" the issue of illegality, then this Court would have been
under the same obligation. The issue is not before this Court; the facts necessary to analyze this
issue were not before the Court. Had this Court considered that the illegality issue applied to the
original awards, it would have raised it and this case would have been resolved. The Court did
not do so. Syringa I focused on standing in relation to the Qwest "amended contract"; it did not
provide Syringa ( or the district court) with an opportunity to attack the original awards. If this
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decision meant that the original awards were void, it would have clearly stated that they
were.

Thus, the viability of the original awards cannot be reached by the district court's

decision.
As a result of the district court's ruling, ENA is before this Court on a summary judgment
ruling that its contract was invalid despite the fact that it has never been provided the opportunity
to present facts or argument on this critical issue. Even if Quiring imposed upon the district
court the obligation to address the illegality of the amendments subsequent to this Court passing
on such a duty, it does not require that this Court make rulings without a full trial on the merits
that considered any affirmative defenses that may bar the claim altogether.
In Morrison v. Young, an action regarding title to a tract of land, the district court
declared, prior to hearing a motion for summary judgment, that it was raising the issue of
illegality of the contract. 136 Idaho 316, 32 P.3d 1116 (2001). The court considered the original
conveyance of the property to be against public policy because it avoided an obligation to pay
child support. Id. at 317, 32 P.3d at 1117. While the court ruled that the transaction was void, it
only left the parties in the situation in which it found them, with the Youngs retaining title. Id. at
318, 32 P.3d at 1118. The Morrisons appealed, arguing that the entire transaction, including the
original conveyance to the Youngs, and the oral agreement to repurchase the property, should be
declared illegal. Id. This Court ruled that the entire agreement should be set aside and remanded
to the district court. Id. at 320, 32 P.3d at 1120. However, because the Youngs had asserted
affirmative defenses in their answer, and reasserted them on appeal, this Court ruled that the
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district court was to consider them on remand as they may have "precluded the bringing of this
action." Id.
This Court ruled that ENA was dismissed; accordingly, the doctrines of res judicata and
claim preclusion deprived the district court of jurisdiction to hold that ENA's contract with the
State was illegal. Even if the district court assumed from this Court's ruling that it was forced to
declare the contract illegal when this Court had not, it must first have jurisdiction to rule. ENA
asserts that the motion to dismiss framed an issue of law that required its dismissal; if, however,
this Court disagrees, ENA was still entitled to be heard on its motion and, at a minimum similar
to !Yforrison, is entitled to remand for consideration of ENA's motion asserting those affirmative
defenses. Even though the district court believed it was authorized to raise the issue of illegality
on remand, it can only properly do so if the contract is before the court. ENA's affirmative
defenses will show, as in Morrison, that Syringa is precluded from asserting its claims against
ENA Thus, it was error for the district court to use its duty to raise the issue of illegality to
avoid ruling on ENA's affirmative defenses.
D.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AGAINST ENA.

In the event that this Court disagrees with ENA's contention that it is not a proper party
to this post-appeal action and that the merits of its motion should not have been disregarded,
ENA further contends that it was error to issue judgment on the merits. In addition to, and in
many regards similar to, the arguments raised above that the district court erred in adding ENA
as a party and subsequently denying its motion to dismiss, the district court erred in granting
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judgment against ENA.

By granting summary judgment in favor of Syringa, the

district court ignored basic rules and principles of law.

While Syringa I contemplated that

Syringa had standing to assert a theory that it had not pled, the articulation of the theory is only
the beginning of the analysis of what, if any, additional fact finding might be required or relief
might actually result. The summary conclusion that the original awards are invalid several years
into the performance of the contract leaves unresolved several of EN A's defenses to this claim of
illegality and deprives ENA of its right to present facts that are material to these issues.
1.

The district court did not provide ENA with a meaningful opportunity to
respond to Syringa's motion or support its converted motion.

First, contrary to Rules 12 and 56 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and basic due
process of law, ENA was found to be a party to a summary judgment motion that was filed long
before it was made a party and was never given an opportunity to properly support its motion to
dismiss once converted.
a.

The motion for partial summary iudgment was prematurely filed as to the
claims against ENA.

On remand, Syringa filed a motion for partial summary judgment on March 20, 2014,
moving for judgment against the State to declare the SBPOs void by operation of I.C. § 67-5725.
(R, Vol. I, pp. 526-28.) ENA was not served in this post-appeal matter until July 3, 2014, when
it was served with Syringa's Post-Appeal Complaint, fifteen (15) weeks after Syringa's motion
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was filed. Procedurally, as to ENA, this was contrary to Rule 56(a) because it was not filed after
the minimum twenty days period from service of process required under the rule. 8
Federal courts have previously abided by a similar rule 9 for filing of motions for
summary judgment by the plaintiff. 10 United States v. Gottlieb, 424 F. Supp. 417, 419 (S.D. Fla.
1976). Under certain circumstances, federal courts have found a plaintiffs filing the motion
premature to be "fatally defective" and, in some cases have denied the motion for summary
judgment. See, e.g., Scaffidi v. United Nissan, 425 F. Supp. 2d 1159, 1166 (D. Nev. 2005)
(citing Local Union No. 490, United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers of Am., AFLCIO v. Kirkhill Rubber Co., 367 F.2d 956, 958 (9th Cir. 1966)); Justice v. Fabey, 541 F. Supp.

1019, 1025 (E.D. Pa. 1982); but see McDougall v. Donovan, 552 F. Supp. 1206, 1212 (N.D. Ill.
1982) (denying motion to strike prematurely filed summary judgment motion because of
8

Rule 56(a) states, in part:
A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory
judgment may, at any time after the expiration of twenty (20) days from the service of process
upon the adverse party or that party's appearance in the action or after service of a motion for
summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without supporting affidavits for a
summary judgment in that party's favor upon all or any part thereof.

I.R.C.P. 56(a) (emphasis added).
9 Idaho courts may look to rulings on the scope of similar federal rules to aid interpretation of Idaho rules. Martin v.
Hoblit, 133 Idaho 372, 376, 987 P.2d 284, 288, n.3 (1999); Compton v. Compton, 101 Idaho 328, 334, 612 P.2d
1175, 1181, n. l (1980); see also Teurlings v. Larson, 156 Idaho 65, 71, 320 P.3d 1224, 1230 (2013) (looking to
federal statutes for interpretation of consistent state statutes); Rudeen v. Cenarrusa, 136 Idaho 560, 568, 38 P.3d
598,606 (2001) (looking to rulings of federal courts for guidance in interpreting state constitutional guarantees).

Rule 56(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, currently directs, as of the 2010 Amendments, that a "party
may file a motion for summary judgment at any time until 30 days after the close of all discovery." F.R.C.P. 56(b).
However, previously, federal Rule 56(a) read similar to the current Rule 56(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure,
stating a motion may be filed "at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action."
See F.R.C.P. 56(b), Advisory Committee Notes, 1946 Amendment, and compare with I.R.C.P. 56(a) ("after the
expiration of twenty (20) days from the service ofprocess") (emphasis added).
10
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pending motion to dismiss); Morrow v. Bassman, 515 F. Supp. 587, 599, n.22 (S.D.
Ohio I 981) (allowing for possibility of renewal of motion once amended complaint filed); First

Am. Bank, NA. v. United Equity Corp., 89 F.R.D. 81, 87 (D.D.C. 1981) (determining a court has
discretion to postpone decision on motion for summary judgment to consider further pleading).
Here, grant of summary judgment against ENA per a motion filed by Syringa fifteen weeks prior
to ENA being served would qualify as an extreme case requiring Syringa' s motion to be
overturned as to ENA.
For example, in Scaffidi, the court denied partial summary judgment as to a party added
to an amended cross-claim on the same day the summary judgment motion was filed. 425 F.
Supp. 2d at 1166. Basing its reasoning on Rule 56(a) then in place, the court reasoned that since
"NMAC filed its amended cross-claim on the same day as its motion for partial summary
judgment, less than 20 days after the commencement of the action against Grenville Pridham,
NMAC's motion was premature and fatally defective procedurally." Id.; see also United States

v. Cannabis Cultivators Club, 5 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1098 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (finding summary
judgment motion premature when filed on same day lawsuit filed).
Also instructive on this issue of a prematurely filed motion is an Arizona state case,

Morrison v. Shanwick International Corporation, utilizing Arizona's Rule 56(a), which is very
similarly worded to that of Idaho's Rule. 167 Ariz. 39, 41-3, 804 P.2d 768, 770-2 (Ct. App.
1990).

In Shanwick, the plaintiffs filed a complaint on November 23, 1988, against the

corporation defendant Shanwick, Johnny Shannon, and Mr. Shannon's wife, listed as "Jane Doe"
Shannon. Id. at 41,804 P.2d at 770. A motion for summary judgment was filed on January 31,
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989, and service was finally made on the wife, Darlene Shannon on February 9. Id. One month
later, a minute entry was filed showing summary judgment had been granted against the
corporation and Darlene Shannon. Id.

Two weeks later, Darlene Shannon filed a separate

answer in response to an application for default, and then on April 5, filed an objection to the
entry of judgment against her on the basis of the improper procedure utilized against her
interests. Judgment was formally entered one month later, and an appeal was filed. Id. at 41-2,
804 P.2d at 770-1. On appeal, the court stated that the plaintiff "had failed to follow the filing
procedure described in Rule 56(a)" as to Darlene Shannon. However, even though Darlene
Shannon had failed to raise this defect to the trial court, the court specifically stated that this
procedural defect would normally preclude summary judgment against her. 11 Id.
In the present case, summary judgment was granted against ENA even though it had not
been served with the Post Appeal Complaint until fifteen weeks after Syringa's motion was filed.
Indeed, the district court found against ENA on the merits without formally holding that ENA
was a party! Such procedure as against ENA should be found to be fatally defective, similar to
the cases analyzed above. In fact, the procedure as to ENA in this case is even more flawed than
in Shanwick where the adverse party was served with the lawsuit nine days after the summary
judgment motion was filed, or in Scaffidi and Cannabis Cultivators Club, where the summary

The court did, however, grant relief to Darlene Shannon on an alternative basis and reversed summary judgment
as to her. 167 Ariz. at 41-2, 804 P.2d at 770-1. The alternative relief granted will be addressed in Section III.D.1.b
below. As for the present case, ENA first raised this defect in its Motion for Reconsideration Re Memorandum
Decision and Order Re Pending Dispositive Motions. (R., p. 1735.)
11
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judgment motions were filed the same day as the claims naming the adverse parties. Such an
extreme procedural flaw in this case requires reversal of summary judgment as to ENA.
b.

ENA was not notified that its motion to dismiss was going to be treated as
a motion for summary ;udgment, depriving it ofan opportunity to present
all of its defenses to Syringa 's amended Count Three.

Even if the Court were to find that Syringa's prematurely filed motion as to ENA does
not prejudice ENA, it was error for the district court to not notify ENA (and the other parties)
that it would consider ENA's motion to dismiss as a summary judgment motion per Rule 12(b),
and not address the merits of ENA's motion to dismiss prior to Syringa's motion. Since ENA
was not made aware of the district court's intention to address its motion under Rule 56
simultaneously with Syringa's motion, ENA was not given an opportunity to present evidence
designed to refute Syringa's request for entry of a judgment against its interests, or to seek
additional time to conduct discovery under I.R.C.P 56(:t). Not only were ENA's jurisdictional
challenges ignored, its right to present its full case to the court was also ignored.
In response to the pleading against it, ENA filed its motion to dismiss, based solely on the
various jurisdictional reasons it believed it could not properly be added as a party to the postappeal action. ENA reasonably relied on I.R.C.P. 12(a) that it would not be required to answer
and present all defenses to Syringa's Post-Appeal Complaint until the district court had ruled on
its motion. However, the district court converted ENA's motion challenging jurisdiction to a
motion for summary judgment on the merits of the case and ruled that it did not have to address
the merits of ENA's motion prior to addressing the merits of Syringa's motion. An implication
must necessarily arise from this, in addition to the fact that ENA had not filed an answer or
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further opposition to the substantive nature of Syringa' s motion, that the district court did not and
could not properly and completely determine whether there were any applicable principles of law
or genuine issues of fact that would have precluded summary judgment. See I.R.C.P. 56(c)
("The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if [the applicable materials] show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law."). The resulting grant of summary judgment in favor of Syringa is in many
respects, as to ENA, similar in effect to a default judgment against ENA. This is contrary to the
protections of the applicable rules and the principle of due process.

Thus, any summary

judgment decision as to ENA should, at the very least, be postponed until ENA is provided with
an opportunity to file a direct opposition to Syringa' s motion.
i.

Rule 12 (b) protections

On appeal, ENA objects to it not being notified that the district court would rule on its
motion per Rule 56 and not being given an opportunity to file all materials allowed under Rule
56 in direct opposition to the substance of Syringa's motion. EN A's motion went to jurisdiction,
yet the court converted it to a motion on the merits of the case, although EN A's motion presented
no materials that went to the merits. Rule l 2(b) states that parties "shall be given" a "reasonable
opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56" once it is
determined by a Court that a Rule l 2(b) motion should be converted on the basis that the motion
was originally supported by Rule 56 materials. I.R.C.P. 12(b).
The Rule contemplates that the Court is to provide every party notice when it converts a
motion to dismiss under this provision. See Doe v. Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ
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of Latter-Day Saints, 837

Supp. 2d 1145, 1156 (D. Idaho 2011) (ruling on identical provision

in current F.R.C.P. 12(d)).
We think the emphasis in summary judgment practice has been, and must
continue to be, on actual notice. This is made clear not only by Rule 56 itself but
also by [former] Rule 12(b), which expressly provides that when extra-pleading
matters are presented, "all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present
all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56." Without such notice
that allegations of fact are being made for the record, there is no real opportunity
to enter the responses necessary to create the "genuine issue of material fact"
which can stave off summary judgment.

Sardo v. McGrath, 196 F.2d 20, 23 (D.C. Cir. 1952); see also State of Ohio v. Peterson, Lowry,
Rall, Barber & Ross, 585 F.2d 454, 457 (10th Cir. 1978) ("In such circumstance the trial Court
should give the parties notice of the changed status of the motion and thereby provide the parties
to the proceeding the opportunity to present to the Court all material made pertinent to such
motion by Rule 56."). However, in this case, although its motion was converted to a summary
judgment motion, ENA was not provided with any notice or an opportunity to present all
material on which it could have been expected to rely on in support of a typical motion for
summary judgment motion or in opposition to the substantive nature of Syringa's motion. See,

e.g., Wilkicki v. Brady, 882 F. Supp. 1227, 1229 (D.R.I. 1995) (citing l0A C. Wright, A. Miller
& M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2720, at 27) ("This 'notice' requirement consists
of providing 'an adequate opportunity to demonstrate why summary judgment should not be
granted' to the party against whom judgment is entered."). Thus, the record cannot support a
finding that ENA received adequate notice and opportunity to be heard in opposition to Syringa's
motion as specifically required under Rule 12(b).
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ii.

Rule 56 protections

In addition to the notice required in Rule 12(b), Rule 56 provides ENA with procedural
protections to ensure it has been granted a full and fair opportunity to respond to a summary
judgment motion filed against its interests. While federal courts have recognized they have the
discretion to grant summary judgment sua sponte without notice in limited circumstances, 12 see
Schwan-Stabilo Cosmetics GmbH & Co. v. Pacificlink Int'! Corp., 401 F.3d 28, 33 (2d

Cir.2005), the United States Supreme Court has stated that this is only acceptable "as long as the
losing party was on notice that [it] had to come forward with all of [its] evidence." Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,326 (1986).

In one such case, Priestley v. Headminder, Inc., the Circuit Court ruled that the district
court erred in granting summary judgment against a party, Headminder, which Priestley had not
made any indication that she intended to include in the relief she was seeking on summary
judgment. 647 F.3d 497, 504 (2d Cir. 2011). The district court however granted summary
judgment against Headminder and the two parties named in Priestley's motion. In reaching its
decision, the Circuit Court found that Headminder did not have notice that the court was
considering summary judgment against it or an opportunity to demonstrate the existence of a
genuine issue of material fact related to its obligations in the matter. Id. The Court stated that it
was "clear" that the district court had failed to afford Headminder certain procedural protections.
Id.

12

In effect, the district court has granted summary judgment against ENA sua sponte without notice.
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[The district court] not only ignored the fact that Priestley did not move for
summary judgment against Headminder, but it also failed to give Headminder
notice that it was considering entering summary judgment against it. Accordingly,
we hold that the court erred in granting summary judgment against Headminder.

Id.
In this matter, ENA was not on notice at the time it was served with a copy of the Post
Appeal Complaint that Syringa sought relief against ENA in a pending summary judgment
motion. Review of the filed motion specifically lists only the State as a party against which
Syringa sought relief. (R., p. 526 ("Syringa ... moves ... for partial summary judgment against
Defendant Idaho Department of Administration . . . . ").)

Faced with a deadline to file a

responsive pleading or a 12(b) motion, ENA filed its motion to dismiss based on theories of res
judicata, law of the case, and judicial estoppel.

(R., pp. 1434-6.)

As stated above, ENA

reasonably relied on I.R.C.P. 12(a) that it would not be required to answer and present all
defenses to Syringa's Post-Appeal Complaint until the district court had ruled on its motion.
Subsequently, Syringa did file an amended notice of hearing on August 21, 2014, and included
within that it was limiting the scope of its motion pursuant the court's Order, but did not indicate
it was seeking summary judgment against any additional parties in the notice. (See R., pp. 1661,
1745, 2033.) Regardless of whether this may have provided sufficient notice that Syringa was
moving for summary judgment against ENA as well, similar to Priestley, this can hardly be
considered notice that the district court intended to include ENA in its ruling on Syringa's
motion. ENA received no further notice that summary judgment may be filed against it prior to
the district court's decision, which not only disregarded the merits of ENA's motion, but was
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made without any recognition that procedural protections existed to provide ENA an opportunity
to present all of its defenses. Accordingly, ENA was not on notice that it had to come forward
with all of its evidence, and summary judgment, as to ENA, was improperly ruled in Syringa's
favor.
iii. Due process protections

Most importantly, however, granting summary judgment against ENA's interests under
these circumstances denies ENA its right to due process of law. Denying ENA an opportunity to
protect its interests under SBPO 1309, as well as disregarding the merits of ENA's motion
violates basic considerations of procedural fairness and ENA's right to due process of law.
Idaho's Constitution requires than no person shall be deprived of property without due process of
law. ID CONST. Art. I, § 13. Similarly, the Due Process Clause of the Federal Constitution
requires a fundamental opportunity to be heard if a deprivation of property by adjudication is at
issue. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975). Such a deprivation requires reversal of the
judgment as to ENA
Generally, the Court may declare a judgment void only for defects of
personal jurisdiction or subject-matter jurisdiction. However, a judgment is also
void if the "court's action amounts to a plain usurpation of power constituting a
violation of due process." ...
"Procedural due process requires that there must be some process to
ensure that the individual is not arbitrarily deprived of his rights in violation of the
state or federal constitutions." "[A]n individual must be provided with notice and
an opportunity to be heard." Due process is not a rigid concept. Instead, the
protections and safeguards necessary vary according to the situation. The
appellate court will evaluate the constitutionality of the proceedings as a whole.
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v. Hansen, 148 Idaho 283, 291-92, 221 P.3d 81, 89-90 (2009) (citations omitted). At the

time of the motion for partial summary judgment, ENA had dutifully performed under the
contract for five years. ENA was not provided a reasonable opportunity to contest Syringa's
attack on its property interests in that contract. ENA questioned and awaited a ruling on whether
it could, as a party previously dismissed from the proceeding, be forced to participate in the
matter again, but instead of receiving a ruling clarifying its legal position in the case, it was
instructed rather that all its rights were stripped without being given an opportunity to defend or
object. This can hardly be considered the provision of due process.
A review of the Shanwick case is further illustrative on this issue. In Shanwick, the
district court had found that filing a summary judgment motion against a party nine days prior to
serving her with a copy of the complaint was improper procedurally. 167 Ariz. at 42, 804 P.2d at
771. Normally, such a circumstance would preclude summary judgment against that party but
relief was not granted because the defect had not been challenged below. Id. However, the court
eventually reversed summary judgment as to this defendant by finding that the defect was a
denial of due process. Id. at 43, 804 P.2d at 772. The court stated that while the "regular and
established rules of procedure" provide an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner, the defendant in the case was not afforded such. Id. at 42, 804 P.2d at 771.
Among the factors leading to this conclusion were the facts that this defendant was served with
the complaint after the summary judgment motion was filed; the motion was mailed to her
eventual attorney prior to service (finding that there is no presumption that the attorney was her
attorney of record at the time the motion was mailed); and most importantly, the theories and
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requests for relief in the motion specifically named another defendant. Id. at 41-2, 804 P.2d at
770-1. The court also stated that the due process problems could not be rectified by her motion
for reconsideration. Id. at 42, 804 P.2d at 771. Thus granting summary judgment against her
was reversed. Id.
Similar to the defendant in Shanwick who was also served with a copy of the complaint
after the motion for summary judgment, ENA was denied its due process by not being given a
meaningful opportunity to protect its interests eventually at risk in the summary judgment
motion. Also similar to the finding of a depravation of due process in Shanwick, ENA was not
served with a copy of the motion at the time of its filing, and the record does not support a
finding that prior to July 2014, its attorneys from the first action were authorized to accept
service in the second action. Finally, ENA was not listed as a party in Syringa's request for
relief in its motion. As a result of the lack of notice and opportunity, ENA was denied its rights.
However, in its Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motions to Reconsider, the district court
found that ENA had been given notice and an opportunity to be heard. (R., pp. 2034-35.) The
court only based this on the fact that ENA had been served with the complaint, and that in its
view, ENA had "ample" opportunity to respond to Syringa's motion, but made no mention to the
prematurely filed motion. (R., p. 2035.) The district court's decision denied ENA due process.
Therefore, summary judgment as to ENA and its interests should be reversed.
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ENA did not have an opportunity to develop the record to show judgment
against it is improper.

Had ENA been provided with a meaningful opportunity to file arguments and materials
in support of an opposition to Syringa' s motion or to put forth all its defenses and arguments in
support of its converted motion, it would have presented additional evidence to show judgment
against it as a matter of law would have been improper.

For example, ENA would, at a

minimum, argue that a judgment in this matter cannot reach the interests of ENA for the same
jurisdictional reasons that ENA should never have been made a party to this post-appeal action.
In fact, Syringa sought no relief against ENA in its post-appeal litigation because Syringa
suffered no damage due to ENA. Also, the terms and conditions of the SBPO and subsequent
agreements between the State and ENA prevent the district court from ruling against the interests
of ENA in SBPO 1309. Some of the arguments that could be presented by ENA to show that
Syringa was not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, as to ENA, are briefly summarized
below to show ENA is prepared to submit defenses to Syringa's claims.
a.

This Court only remanded "count three seeking to set aside the State's
contract with Qwest. "

Consistent with the jurisdictional arguments set forth above, the law of the case as framed
by the Syringa I decision, prevents consideration of whether Syringa could set aside the State's
award to ENA. A case "must be tried in light of and in consonance with the rules of law as
announced by the appellate court in that particular case." Robideaux, CV 2005 8728, 2006 WL
3304476 at* 7. While the district court's authority over the claims in count three is established
from the Syringa I opinion, the authority to expand the claims in count three to reach ENA is
APPELLANT ENA SERVICES, LLC, A DIVISION OF EDUCATION NETWORKS OF AMERICA, INC.'S
OPENING BRIEF - 49
45950-001 I 809923

restrained by the very opinion that resulted in the remand, especially since this Court affirmed
ENA's dismissal from this action. Thus, any judgment against ENA's interests would not be in
conformity to the mandate of this Court.
b.

Syringa was not damaged by the interests of ENA.

Syringa originally filed suit challenging the award to Qwest and not the award to ENA.
As previously noted, Syringa sought to preserve the possibility that it could still leverage its
position to be able to provide the internet "backbone" for the IEN, and always intended that ENA
would control the E-Rate portion of the IEN.

Therefore, the award to ENA did not cause

damages to Syringa.
Generally, a party is required to show some type of injury in fact and a likelihood that the
requested relief will redress the injury. Young v. City of Ketchum, 137 Idaho 102, 104, 44 P.3d
1157, 1159 (2002). To show an injury, there has to be a connection between the injury and the
challenged conduct in a matter. Id. However, there is no connection between Syringa and ENA,
as this Court previously found, Syringa is not a party to ENA's award. Syringa I, 155 Idaho at
61, 305 P.3d at 505 (Syringa's "position as an intended subcontractor of ENA does not make it a
party to ENA's contract with the State, nor does it create privity of contract with the State.").
Thus, Syringa cannot demonstrate that it has been injured by ENA, nor that the relief it sought
could in some way be redressed by a favorable decision.
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c.

Syringa did not seek anv relief against ENA or the original SBPO 1309 in
its Post Appeal Complaint or its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.

Syringa's Post Appeal Complaint only sought relief as to the amended SBPOs. No relief
was sought regarding the original award to ENA. Also, Syringa's motion for partial summary
judgment only sought a judgment as a matter of law against the State. (R., p. 526.) Syringa did
not seek relief against ENA in its motion. Thus, it would be inappropriate to enter judgment
against ENA based on its original award.

d.

Syringa 's post-appeal litigation could not challenge SBPO 1309.

The circumstances in this case limit Syringa' s challenge to the amended SBPOs.
However, the judgment eventually entered below declares that the original awards, as amended,
are void.

ENA has not been given an opportunity to present arguments to show that any

judgment entered in Syringa' s favor must be limited to the amended awards, and thus, could not
affect ENA's interests in the original SBPO 1309.

i.

Syringa conceded the original JEN awards were valid.

Most importantly, as the district court previously found, Syringa was judicially estopped
from challenging the original SBPOs. This ruling was based on the fact that Syringa did not
raise any challenge to the original awards in its appeal, and also, that it had conceded that the
original awards were valid. (R., pp. 1399-1402.) The principle of judicial estoppel cannot allow
Syringa to seek relief that would challenge the validity of the original awards. See Sword, 140
Idaho at 252, 92 P.3d at 502 (disallowing attempt to seek advantage by taking incompatible
positions). Further, even the district court doubted whether Syringa had any standing to take an
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opposite position to challenge the original awards. (R., p. 1402, n.6.) Accordingly, Syringa's
motion could not reach the original awards.

ii.

The State of Idaho's Standard Contract Terms and Conditions
severed the "Amendment" from SBPO 13 09.

Another argument that ENA has not been given an opportunity to develop is related to
the terms of the original award under the State's Standard Contract Terms and Conditions. One
of the State's standard terms was a severability clause which would validate all remaining terms
of the SBPO in the event one of items was held to be invalid or unenforceable. (R., pp. 167683.) Accordingly, ENA should be allowed to present an argument that the awards remain valid
even if the "Amendments" are declared void.

However, ENA was never provided with a

meaningful opportunity to file arguments and materials in support of an opposition to Syringa' s
motion or to put forth all its defens es and arguments when its motion was converted, and
contends that it would be proper to allow ENA to argue judgment against it as a matter of law
would have been improper.

E.

ENA IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL.
Finally, ENA believes that if it prevails on appeal, it is entitled to attorney's fees.

Generally, a prevailing party is entitled to attorney's fees under I. C. § 12-120(3) in a civil matter
to recover on any commercial transaction.
In any civil action to recover on an open account, account stated, note, bill,
negotiable instrument, guaranty, or contract relating to the purchase or sale of
goods, wares, merchandise, or services and in any commercial transaction unless
otherwise provided by law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable
attorney's fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs.
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I.

§ 1 120(3). The term "commercial transaction" in the statute applies to "all transactions

except transactions for personal or household purposes." LC. § 12-120(3). "The crucial test in
determining whether a civil action arose out of a commercial transaction is whether the
commercial transaction comprises the gravamen of the lawsuit; it must be integral to the claim
and constitute the basis upon which the party is attempting to recover." Johannsen v. Utterbeck,
146 Idaho 423,432, 196 P.3d 341, 350 (2008); see also Sims v. Jacobson, 157 Idaho 980, _ ,
342 P.3d 907, 912 (2015) ("[W]hether a party can recover attorney fees under Idaho Code
Section 12-120(3) depends on whether the gravamen of a claim is a commercial transaction.").
The statute does not require that a contract exists before it is to be applied; it "only requires a
commercial transaction." Sims, 157 Idaho at _ , 342 P.3d at 912; lvfackay v. Four Rivers
Packing Co., 145 Idaho 408,415, 179 P.3d 1064, 1017 (2008) ("Where an action is one to

recover in a commercial transaction, that claim triggers the application of section 12-120(3) and
the prevailing party may recover fees 'regardless of the proof that the commercial transaction did
in fact occur."'). Further, the statute applies to a declaratory judgment action if a commercial
transaction is the gravamen of the action. In re Univ. Place/Idaho Water Ctr. Project, 146 Idaho
527, 541, 199 P.3d 102, 116 (2008). Therefore, if ENA is the prevailing party in this appeal,
ENA is entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to I. C. § 12-120(3).
In University Place, this Court adopted a definition of "transaction" that states it consists
"of an act or agreement, or several acts or agreements, having some connection with each other,
in which more than one person is concerned, and by which the legal relations of such persons
between themselves are altered." 146 Idaho at 542, 199 P.3d at 117. The University Place Court
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stated that it had given the word "transaction" a broad meanmg, citing to vanous cases
illustrating various proceedings or claims arising out of the same transaction. Id. at 541-2, 199
P.3d at 116-7. Here, there can be no dispute that this post-appeal litigation (like Syringa's
previous litigation in Syringa I) is entirely related to the SBPOs awarded under the IEN RFP, and
that these SBPOs are commercial transactions. To state in other words, without the SBPOs,
Syringa's claims would not have been brought.

The SBPOs are the gravamen of Syringa's

amended count three as they form the basis upon which Syringa sought relief in its Post Appeal
Complaint.

The bids in response to the IEN RFP, the SBPOs, and each of the parties

participating in this matter, are all intimately intertwined to the ultimate purpose of the IEN to
award a contract for the construction and management of the IEN. Although no enforceable
contract exists between Syringa and any of the Defendants/Appellants, Syringa has sought relief
related to the IEN transaction. Further, the IEN contract was not for personal or household
purposes. I.C. § 12-120(3). If the Court finds in favor of ENA, ENA is entitled to fees pursuant
to Idaho Code § 12-120(3) as the prevailing party in an action based on a commercial
transaction. Therefore, this Court should award ENA its attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code
§ 12-120(3).

IV.

CONCLUSION

This Court should reverse the district court's decision granting summary judgment
against ENA because Syringa is barred from asserting additional claims against ENA in this
matter and because ENA was deprived of an opportunity to present all arguments and evidence
in opposition to Syringa's claims. ENA further requests that the Court award it costs and fees.
APPELLANT ENA SERVICES, LLC, A DIVISION OF EDUCATION NETWORKS OF AMERICA, INC'S
OPENING BRIEF - 54
45950-001 I 809923

DATED this

ofNovember, 2015.
GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER OBERRECHT, P.A.

BRADLEY ARANT BOUL T CUMMINGS LLP
Robert S. Patterson Of the Firm
Attorneys for Appellant ENA Services, LLC, a Division of
Education Networks of America, Inc.

APPELLANT ENA SERVICES, LLC, A DIVISION OF EDUCATION NETWORKS OF AMERICA, INC. 'S
OPENING BRIEF - 55
45950-001 / 809923

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on t h e ~ day of November, 2015, I caused to be served a
true copy of APPELLANT ENA SERVICES, LLC, A DIVISION OF EDUCATION
NETWORKS OF AMERICA, INC.'S OPENING BRIEF, by the method indicated below,
and addressed to each of the following:
David R. Lombardi
Melodie A. McQuade
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
601 W. Bannock
P. 0. Box 2720
Boise, ID 83701
Fax: (208) 388-1300
Merlyn W. Clark
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS &
HAWLEYLLP
877 W Main St, Ste 1000
PO Box 1617
Boise, ID 83701-1617
Fax: (208) 954-5210

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy
E-Mail

~

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy
E-Mail

Stephen R. Thomas
MOFFATT THOMAS BARRETT ROCK
& FIELDS CHARTERED
101 S Capitol Blvd, 10th Fl
PO Box 829
Boise, ID 83701-0829
Fax: (208) 385-5384

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy
E-Mail

B. Lawrence Theis
Steven Perfrement
BRYAN CAVE HRO
1700 Lincoln Street, Suite 4100
Denver, CO 80203
Fax: (303) 866-0200

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy
E-Mail

APPELLANT ENA SERVICES, LLC, A DIVISION OF EDUCATION NETWORKS OF AMERICA, INC'S
OPENING BRIEF - 56
45950-001 I 809923

